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Abstract
This paper studies the price e®ects of shocks to the degree of com-
petition. It is motivated by initiatives to enhance competition in ser-
vices in the European Union. The paper shows that a higher degree of
competition in the nontradable goods sector may have adverse implica-
tions for international price competitiveness. It highlights four chan-
nels through which enhanced competition in the non-tradable goods
sector a®ects the general price level in a large, open economy (lower
monopoly rents, lower import prices, higher demand for real money
balances, higher wages) and assesses their relative importance alge-
braically. The conclusions are supportive of the Single Market and
point at possible implications for monetary policy.
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1 Introduction
The degree of competition in many services markets in Europe is relatively
low. Therefore, these markets are priority ¯elds of action for the competition
authorities.1 Initiatives by the European Commission promote the comple-
tion of a truly Single Market where monopolies, price agreements between
suppliers and preferential treatment of domestic suppliers by governments
are forbidden by law. Moreover, EU member states are { albeit sometimes
hesitantly { liberalising their network industries (telecom, energy, railways,
water) and upgrading anti-trust legislation and enforcement.
This paper studies the e®ects of increasing the degree of competition
in the services sector on the aggregate price level. Competition policy is
likely to a®ect output and prices in the sector targeted by the competition
authorities, but it may have e®ects on other sectors as well. In case of a
large economy, such as the European Union, there may even be spillovers to
other countries. Understanding the macroeconomic consequences of microe-
conomic reform is of interest to government and central bank policymakers
alike. After all, governments do not seek to enhance competition per se, but
in order to achieve perceived bene¯ts for the economy as a whole. For mon-
etary policymakers, it is particularly relevant to know how product market
liberalisation in a limited number of sectors a®ects the general price level.
See, for instance, ECB (2001).
To address this issue, I build on the framework by Obstfeld and Ro-
go® (1995, 1996). Their model allows for imperfect competition, short-run
nominal rigidities and rich exchange rate dynamics. Obstfeld and Rogo®'s
basic model is a two-country model with monopolistic competition and a
single di®erentiated tradable good. This framework enables me to take into
account that Europe is a large open economy, so that competition policy
may a®ect the current account and the terms of trade.
This paper distinguishes between tradable and non-tradable goods. It
allows for imperfect competition in both the tradable and the non-tradable
goods sector. It takes into account the fact that the degree of competition in
non-tradables (services) markets tends to be lower than the degree of com-
petition in tradable (goods) markets. This is an extension of the literature.
This extended model is used to study the impact of an increase in the degree
of competition in the non-tradables sector. As in Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2001), the elasticity of substitution between products is interpreted as an
instrument of competition policy.
1See Gonenc, Maher and Nicoletti (2000) en Van Bergeijk and Ha®ner (1995).
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I obtain the following results. First, an increase in the degree of com-
petition in the non-tradable goods sector may have adverse implications
for international competitiveness. Intuitively, more competition in the non-
tradables sector triggers an increase in labour demand in the non-tradables
sector, which causes a bidding up of wages and draws labour from the trad-
able goods sector, leading to lower tradables output and a higher price for
tradables in the new equilibrium. The implication is that deregulating the
domestic services sector, via its impact on wages, will make a country less
competitive internationally.
Second, I highlight the existence of four channels through which an in-
crease in the degree of competition in the non-tradables sector may a®ect the
general price level. Most important is the direct e®ect via downward pres-
sure on pro¯ts margins. For a large country, enhancing competition in the
non-tradables sector also a®ects the general price level via an improvement
in the terms of trade and via an increase in the demand for real money
balances (more competition leads to a short-run accumulation of net for-
eign assets. This enables households to increase consumption, which means
that real money balances have to increase). These two e®ects re-inforce the
downward impact on the general price level caused by the decline in pro¯t
margins. The fourth channel works in the other direction: the expansion of
output in the non-tradables sector leads ¯rms to bid up the wage rate, which
increases labour costs and has an upward impact on the general price level.
I show that, for all realistic parameter values, an increase in the degree of
competition in the non-tradables sector reduces the general price level in the
domestic economy. This result is supportive of the Single Market project and
of the initiatives by EU national authorities to deregulate domestic services
markets. I provide an expression for the impact of enhanced competition on
the in°ation rate in the transitional period between two steady states, which
could in principle be used by the ECB to derive the appropriate temporary
adjustment of its de¯nition of price stability.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next sec-
tion, the basic model is presented and equilibrium conditions under optimal
behaviour by households and ¯rms are derived. Section 3 presents a log-
linearised version of the model. Section 4 analyses the consequences of a
permanent shock to the degree of competition. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The model
2.1 Market structure and preferences
The world consists of two countries of identical size. Both countries are
inhabited by a continuum of monopolistic producers. Producers in the Home
country are indexed by z 2 [0; 12 ], producers in the Foreign country are
indexed by z 2 (12 ; 1]. Each of them produces a single tradable good zT and
a single non-tradable good zN . The markets for tradable and non-tradable
goods are characterised by monopolistic competition.
Household preferences are de¯ned over an intertemporal utility function
which includes a consumption index, real money balances and work e®ort:
Ut =
X
s=t
¯s¡t[logCs + Â log(
Ms
Ps
) ¡ ·
2
L2s]; (1)
where U is the lifetime utility of a representative Home household, C is com-
posite real consumption, M is the amount of nominal money balances held
by the representative household, P is a consumption-based price de°ator, L
is the amount of labour used in production, ¯ is the discount factor, Â is
the parameter associated with the utility derived from holding real money
balances, · captures the disutility of work e®ort and t, s are time subscripts.
Time subscripts will be suppressed whenever possible. The expressions for
Foreign variables are identical to those found for Home (apart from an as-
terisk (¤) and a di®erent indexation of producers) unless stated otherwise.
Let cN (zN ) [cT (zT )] be a Home household's consumption of good zN
[zT ]. Composite non-tradable goods consumption in the Home country is
CN =
"Z 1
2
0
[cN(zN)]
µN¡1
µN dzN
# µN
µN¡1
; (2)
where µN is the degree of substitutability between non-tradable goods in the
Home country.
Tradable goods are sold in the world market. Composite tradable goods
consumption in the Home country is de¯ned by
CT =
·Z 1
0
[cT (zT )]
µT¡1
µT dzT
¸ µT
µT¡1
: (3)
where the degree of substitutability between all tradable goods is equal
to µT , independently of where these goods are produced or consumed, i.e.
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µT = µ¤T . Each of the parameters µT ; µN ; µ¤N is assumed to be larger than
one.
The variable P in the utility function (1) is a consumption-based price
index (de¯ned as the minimum money cost of purchasing one unit of com-
posite real consumption C = C°TC
1¡°
N ), here given by
P = (
PT
°
)°(
PN
1 ¡ ° )
1¡°; (4)
where ° represents the relative preference of the representative household
for tradable over non-tradable goods and PT (PN) is the consumption-based
price index of tradable (non-tradable) goods in the Home country, given by
PT =
·Z 1
0
[pT (zT )]1¡µT dzT
¸ 1
1¡µT
(5)
and
PN =
"Z 1
2
0
[pN(zN )]1¡µN dzN
# 1
1¡µN
(6)
respectively, where pT (zT ) is the money price of the tradable good zT and
pN(zN) is the money price of the non-tradable good zN .
There are no impediments to international trade, so that the law of one
price holds for each individual tradable good: pT (zT ) = Xp¤T (zT ); where X
is the nominal exchange rate, i.e. the price of one unit of Foreign currency
expressed in the Home currency.
There is only one ¯nancial asset, an internationally traded riskless real
bond denominated in the composite tradable consumption good. Firms
are entirely owned by households of the same country. Any ¯rm pro¯ts
are immediately handed back to the owners. Labour is immobile between
countries, so that labour income remains in the own economy. The period
budget constraint for a representative household of the Home country is
PT;tFt + Mt = PT;t(1 + rt¡1)Ft¡1 + Mt¡1 +
+WtLt + ¦t ¡ PN;tCN;t ¡ PT;tCT;t ¡ PT;tTt; (7)
where Ft is the stock of bonds held by the representative household on date
t, rt¡1 is the real interest rate on bonds between t ¡ 1 and t, Wt is the
nominal wage rate, ¦t is ¯rm pro¯ts and Tt is a lump-sum tax or transfer.
Bonds and taxes are denominated in terms of the composite tradable good.
The government budget is balanced at all times. Moreover, there is no
government spending. All seigniorage revenues are redistributed in the form
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of tranfers: 0 = Tt+(Mt¡Mt¡1)=Pt: The nominal interest rate it is de¯ned
by 1 + it = (1 + rt)PT;t+1=PT;t:
2.2 Maximisation of household utility
Maximising one-period composite real consumption C°TC
1¡°
N subject to a
nominal budget constraint yields the following expressions for consumption
of the composite tradable and non-tradable good in the Home country
CT =
µ
°
1 ¡ °
PN
PT
¶1¡°
C; (8)
CN =
µ
1 ¡ °
°
PT
PN
¶°
C: (9)
Similarly, Home demand for an individual (non-)tradable good zT (zN) is:
cT (zT ) =
µ
pT (zT )
PT
¶¡µT
CT ; (10)
cN(zN) =
µ
pN(zN )
PN
¶¡µN
CN : (11)
Demand for an individual tradable (non-tradable) good is decreasing in its
relative price. The elasticity of substitution µT (µN ) turns out to be equal
to the price elasticity of demand for each individual tradable (non-tradable)
good.
The representative household maximises life-time utility (1), subject to
the period budget constraint (7) which must be satis¯ed in every single
period. The ¯rst-order conditions are
CT;t+1 = ¯(1 + rt)CT;t; (12)
CN;t+1 = ¯(1 + rt)
PT;t+1
PT;t
PN;t
PN;t+1
CN;t; (13)
Mt
Pt
= ÂCt
µ
1 + it
it
¶
; (14)
Lst =
1
·
Wt
Pt
1
Ct
: (15)
Equations (12)-(13) are the standard Euler equations for the consumption of
tradable and non-tradable goods, respectively. Equation (14) is the money
demand equation and equation (15) is the labour supply equation.
6
2.3 Maximisation of ¯rm pro¯ts
The representative ¯rm z is a monopolist in the production of a tradable
good zT and a non-tradable good zN . The ¯rm uses only one input: labour,
which is assumed to be homogeneous. The production processes for tradable
and non-tradable goods are assumed to be identical, with constant returns
to scale in production
yT (zT ) = ®lT (zT ); (16)
yN(zN) = ®lN(zN ); (17)
where ® is labour productivity and yT (zN) [yN(zN )] is output of good zT
[zN ]. The goods markets clearing conditions are
yT (zT ) = cwT (zT ); (18)
yN(zN) = cN (zN ): (19)
where world demand per capita for a particular tradable good is cwT (zT ) =
1
2cT (zT ) +
1
2c
¤
T (zT ). The labour market is assumed to be competitive. Also
by assumption, labour is immobile internationally, but fully mobile between
sectors, so there will be a single wage rate W (W ¤) in each country.
It is assumed that each ¯rm produces a tradable and a non-tradable
good. The goods zT and zN are produced in ¯rm z. Firm pro¯ts are
¦(z) = pT (zT )yT (zT ) + pN (zN )yN (zN ) ¡ Wl(z); (20)
where l(z) = lT (zT )+ lN(zN ). The representative ¯rm z chooses pT (zT ) and
pN(zN) in order to maximise total pro¯ts (20). It takes aggregate demand
for tradable and non-tradable goods (CwT , CN) as given. The ¯rst-order
conditions yield the optimal pricing rules for the representative ¯rm
pT (zT ) =
µ
µT
µT ¡ 1
¶
W
®
; (21)
pN(zN) =
µ
µN
µN ¡ 1
¶
W
®
: (22)
2.4 Competition policy
Following Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001), the elasticity of substitution be-
tween di®erent varieties of the Home non-tradable good (µN ) is interpreted
as an instrument of competition policy.2
2The parameter µN can be thought of as being a function of `deep parameters' repre-
senting consumer preferences and competition policy. I assume that consumer preferences
do not change over time, so that changes in µN re°ect changes in competition policy only.
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Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001) consider product market deregulation
along two dimensions: a reduction in entry costs and an increase in the
price elasticity of demand. Intuitively, a government can promote compe-
tition by making it less costly for consumers to switch suppliers (so that
product demand will become more responsive to di®erences in the product
price) or via a reduction in entry costs (so that new ¯rms will enter the mar-
ket, o®ering the same product, but in a di®erent variety or on a di®erent
location). In reality, many deregulations are likely to a®ect both the demand
elasticity and entry costs. For instance, when deregulating the taxi market,
the Dutch government increased the number of licenses (thus reducing the
costs of market entry for ¯rms) and relaxed the rules for choosing a taxi
(thus lowering the switching costs for consumers).3
In this paper, I analyse deregulation in the non-tradable goods sector. I
do not distinguish between di®erent types of competition-promoting govern-
ment measures. Thus, I study a special case of the di®erent possible forms of
product market deregulation presented by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001).4
All types of product market deregulation in this sector will be represented
by a change in µN .
It is important to note that an increase in the parameter µN does not
have a direct impact on utility, even though µN appears in the utility func-
tion (via C). The symmetry among producers implies that, in equilibrium,
households consume all varieties of the non-tradable good in equal propor-
tions (the same is true for the tradable good):
CN =
"Z 1
2
0
[cN(zN)]
µN¡1
µN dzN
# µN
µN¡1
=
·
[cN(h)]
µN¡1
µN
¸ µN
µN¡1
= cN(h);
so that a rise in µN does not augment utility directly. However, an increase
in the elasticity of substitution between non-tradable products a®ects the
elasticity of demand facing ¯rms (which is also equal to µN) and thus reduces
3As a result of the deregulation of the Dutch taxi market, customers are allowed to
stop a taxi on the road, whereas before the deregulation they had to go to a designated
taxi stop and accept the rate o®ered by the ¯rst taxi in line (or walk to the next stop).
4The number of ¯rms plays no explicit role in this paper, but it is implicitly assumed
to be constant. In Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001), product market deregulation may
increase or decrease the number of ¯rms, depending on the mix of particular measures.
An increase in the elasticity of demand leads to net exit of ¯rms, whereas a reduction in
entry costs leads to net entry of ¯rms. For small changes in the elasticity of substitution,
the number of ¯rms remains constant when an increase in substitutability is accompanied
by a proportional decline in entry costs. This is implicitly assumed here, but it will play
no explicit role in the remainder of the paper.
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the monopoly power of ¯rms [see the pricing equation (22)]. This will, ceteris
paribus, lead to lower prices and higher consumption. Thus, an increase in
µN may a®ect utility via its impact on the monopoly power of ¯rms.
3 Loglinearising the model
The model does not yield simple closed-form solutions, due to monopoly
pricing and the endogeneity of output. Therefore, the model will be lin-
earised around a symmetric steady state. The ¯rst step in this direction is
deriving the solution for the initial symmetric steady state.
3.1 A symmetric steady state
In a steady state, all exogenous variables are constant. Steady-state values
will be represented by overbars. The steady state world real interest rate is
r = (1 ¡ ¯)=¯:
From the household budget constraint (7), steady state consumption is:
CN = Y N ; (23)
CT = rF +
P pT
PT
Y T ; (24)
where P pT is the production-based price index of tradable goods in the Home
country and PT is the consumption-based price index of tradable goods in
the Home country. The latter is a®ected not only by domestic producer
prices P pT , but also by import prices (equivalent to exchange-rate adjusted
Foreign producer prices) X(P pT )¤.
The starting condition of zero net foreign assets (F 0 = 0) closes the
model in the sense that the solution is uniquely determined.
In order to simplify the algebra, I assume full international symmetry
in the initial steady state. Therefore, initially µN = µ¤N . International
symmetry also implies that the production-based price index of tradable
goods is equal to the consumption-based price index of tradable goods:
(P pT )0 = (PT )0.
The steady state values of output and the general price level are
Y 0 =
®
h
°
³
µT¡1
µT
´i° h
(1 ¡ °)
³
µN¡1
µN
´i1¡°
·
1
2
h
°
³
µT¡1
µT
´
+ (1 ¡ °)
³
µN¡1
µN
´i 1
2
; (25)
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P 0 =
µ
1 ¡ ¯
Â
¶
M0
1
Y 0
: (26)
In a model with tradables only (° = 1), equation (25) simpli¯es to the
formula reported by Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995), which corresponds to a
similar result obtained earlier by Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) in a static
closed economy framework.
The real wage rate
W 0
P 0
= ®
·
°
µ
µT ¡ 1
µT
¶¸° ·
(1 ¡ °)
µ
µN ¡ 1
µN
¶¸1¡°
(27)
is increasing in the degree of competition in goods markets. Intuitively,
competition pushes down goods prices, which induces a rise in consumption
and output. The resulting increase in labour demand forces ¯rms to bid up
real wages.
Real pro¯ts
¦0
P 0
=
·
°
µT
+
1 ¡ °
µN
¸
Y 0 (28)
increase when the level of turnover (i.e. aggregate output Y 0) increases,
when the degree of competition (µT ; µN) decreases and when consumer pref-
erences (°) shift in favour of the least competitive sector (i.e. in favour
of the good with the lowest price elasticity of demand, which is the most
pro¯table good to the ¯rm).
3.2 Loglinearisation
To allow for asymmetries between the two countries, we log-linearise the
model around the initial steady state. De¯ne bZt = dZt=Z0, that is variables
with a hat denote percentage changes from the initial steady state. The
linearised price equations for Home are:
bPN = ¡ 1µN ¡ 1bµN + cW; (29)bPT = ¡ 1µT ¡ 1bµT + 12(cW + cW ¤) + 12 bX; (30)
An increase in the degree of competition (µ) in a certain sector leads to a
decline of producer prices in that sector. The lower the initial degree of
competition (i.e. the higher 1µ¡1), the larger the price impact of enhanced
competition. A rise in the wage rate at Home leads to a proportional increase
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in the non-tradable consumer price subindex in the Home country and to a
less than proportional increase in the tradable consumer price subindex in
Home and Foreign. An exchange rate movement has an opposite impact on
the price of tradables in the two countries.
The linearised labour demand equation isbL = ÁT bYT + ÁN bYN ; (31)
where
ÁT =
°(µT¡1µT )
°(µT¡1µT ) + (1 ¡ °)(µN¡1µN )
; ÁN =
(1 ¡ °)(µN¡1µN )
°(µT¡1µT ) + (1 ¡ °)( µN¡1µN )
:
Note that ÁT + ÁN = 1. When µT = µN , the expressions simplify to ÁT = °
and ÁN = 1 ¡ °.
4 Product market deregulation
This section studies the impact of product market deregulation in the shielded
sector, where the degree of competition is typically lower than in the open
sector. More precisely, I focus on a permanent increase in the degree of
competition in the Home non-tradable goods sector (i.e. bµN = bµN ).
I will assume a shock takes place at time t ¡ 1, when the economy is
in the initial steady state. In order to follow the dynamics of the economy
after the shock, I will distinguish between the short run and long run. Wages
are assumed to be ¯xed for one period (going from t ¡ 1 to the short-run
equilibrium in period t) and fully °exible thereafter. As in Obstfeld-Rogo®
(1995), the economy reaches its long-run equilibrium in t+1 and remains in
this new steady state thereafter. Thus, there is no Calvo-type staggered price
setting. Shocks are assumed to be small. Therefore, by assumption, both
the short-run equilibrium and the new long-run steady state are su±ciently
close to the initial steady state to justify a linear approximation of the model.
The long-run equilibrium is a steady state. Long-run steady state changes
are indicated by hatted overbarred variables.
The model¶s symmetry admits a simple solution approach. I solve for
di®erences between Home and Foreign variables and for world aggregates.
This approach also provides a better insight in the underlying intuition.
I will ¯rst analyse the price e®ects at the sector level in a closed economy,
then turn to the impact of competition shocks on the current account, the
exchange rate and the terms of trade, and ¯nally discuss the long-run and
short-run price impact in an open economy.
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4.1 Closed economy
In a closed economy, enhancing competition has the following impact on
tradable and non-tradable goods prices:
bP dN = [¡ 1µN ¡ 1 + ÁN2(µN ¡ 1)]bµdN < 0;bP dT = ÁN2(µN ¡ 1)bµdN > 0:
The downward impact of higher non-tradables competition on the mark-
up for non-tradable goods is the ¯rst term in the expression for bP dN . The
additional labour demand in the non-tradables sector results in a higher
wage rate in the entire economy, as labour is mobile across sectors. This
is the positive term common to both expressions. Enhanced competition
in the non-tradables sector forces down pro¯t margins in the non-tradables
sector, but leads to higher real wages economy-wide. Thus, an increase in
the degree of competition in the non-tradable goods sector leads to a decline
in the price of non-tradables, but to a rise in the price of tradables. The
lower the initial degree of competition (µN small), the larger the price e®ects
of enhancing competition. An increase in competition in the non-tradables
sector (for instance, by deregulating the domestic services sector) will make
a country less competitive internationally.
Only little research has been conducted on the impact of sector-speci¯c
competition shocks on the price of goods in other sectors. ECB (2001)
suggests that this indirect price e®ect is likely to be negative, insofar as
inputs for other sectors become cheaper. For instance, deregulation in the
energy sector will lower the electricity costs for companies in other sectors.
There are no intermediate goods in the present model. Instead, I stress
that deregulation in one sector will increase the wage costs for companies in
other sectors. Whether or not the increase in labour costs (the `wage bill')
is indeed more important than the decline in the price of intermediate goods
(the `electricity bill') is an empirical matter.
4.2 Impact on current account, exchange rate and terms of
trade
The reduced-form solution of the short-run current account is:
dF
(CwT )0
=
µT ¡ 1
D
ÁN
2(µN ¡ 1)
bµdN ; (32)
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where D = 2 + r(1 + ÁN + ÁT µT ). Enhanced competition in the Home
non-tradables sector leads to a short-run surplus on the current account.
Intuitively, enhanced competition in the non-tradable goods sector leads to
a shift in Home demand away from tradable goods, which more than o®sets
the higher income which arises from higher employment and the higher
real wage rate in the Home country. The lower Home demand for tradable
goods implies that the short-run current account is in surplus. The short-
run current account surplus is larger if the non-tradables sector is relatively
uncompetitive to start with (i.e. if µN=µT low). In this case, there will
be a larger relative price decline of non-tradable goods, which enhances the
demand shift from tradable to non-tradable goods in the Home country.
The short-run exchange rate immediately jumps to its long-run value.
The exchange rate response is:
bX = bX = µT ¡ 1
µT
µ
ÁN
µN ¡ 1
¶
1
D
bµdN : (33)
A permanent enhancement of non-tradables competition in the Home
country (bµdN > 0) leads to a depreciation of the Home currency ( bX > 0). A
depreciation is required, since the lower Home demand for tradable goods
must be (partially) o®set by higher Foreign demand for tradables.
The increase in producer prices in the Home country's tradable goods
sector more than o®sets the long-run depreciation of the Home currency.
This implies that the Home country's long-run terms of trade improve as a
result of enhanced competition in the non-tradables sector:5
dTOT = bP pT ¡ (bP pT )¤ ¡ bX = ÁN2µT (µN ¡ 1)bµdN + 1 + ÁNµT rdF(CwT )0 ; (34)
The reason is that the relative scarcity of labour (even with the additional
supply) leads ¯rms to bid up the wage rate, so that the price of domestic
tradables increases.6 In the short run, output prices in the Home and Foreign
tradables sector are not a®ected by a change in non-tradables competition,
since nominal wages are ¯xed in the short run. Therefore, the change in the
5Note that part of the impact of the degree of competition on the terms of trade
works via the short-run re-distribution of wealth. This is in line with the well-known
argument by Keynes that a country making international transfer payments will experience
a deterioration in its terms of trade.
6In the special case of perfect competition in the tradables sector (µT ! 1), there
would be no change in the terms of trade. The reason is that under perfect competition
all tradable goods producers behave as price-takers.
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Home country short-run terms of trade is fully determined by the short-run
change in the exchange rate. The depreciation of the Home currency means
that the Home country experiences a short-run deterioration of its terms of
trade.
4.3 Long-run impact
The aggregate international CPI di®erential is
bP d = [¡ 1 ¡ °
µN ¡ 1 +
ÁN
2(µN ¡ 1) ]
bµdN ¡ ° dTOT ¡ ÁT rdF(CwT )0 : (35)
Equation (35) shows four channels through which enhanced competition in
the Home country (bµN > 0) a®ects the general price level. First, enhanced
competition in the non-tradables sector has a downward impact on monopoly
pro¯ts in this sector, which lowers the price of non-tradables goods. The
impact on the general price level is proportional to the size of the non-
tradable sector and inversely related to the initial degree of competition in
this sector, as re°ected in the term ¡ 1¡°µN¡1bµdN . The latter indicates that it
is more e®ective to enhance competition in a sector where ¯rms have a high
degree of monopoly power. Second, the expansion of output in the non-
tradables sector leads to higher labour demand. The bidding up of wages
implies a higher cost of factor inputs for all sectors, which has an upward
impact on the general price level, as shown by the term ÁN2(µN¡1)
bµdN . Normally
(when ÁN ¼ 1 ¡ °), this e®ect reduces the price impact of the ¯rst channel
by roughly one half. Third, deregulating the non-tradables sector leads to
an improvement in the Home country's terms of trade. The impact on the
general price level of the terms of trade improvement is given by ¡° dTOT .
This channel is likely to be relatively small.7 Fourth, enhanced competition
in the non-tradables sector generates a positive wealth e®ect for the Home
country (dF > 0). The ensuing higher level of consumption implies that
demand for real money balances goes up. Therefore, keeping the nominal
money supply unchanged, the general price level must go down to restore
equilibrium in the money market. This fourth channel is also likely to be
7The terms of trade channel will become negligible if ° ! 0 or ° ! 1, as can be seen
from the fully-reduced form. Intuitively, if the non-tradables sector is very small (° ! 1),
enhanced competition in the non-tradables sector leads to a negligible change in import
prices. Conversely, if the tradables sector is very small (° ! 0), even a large decline in
import prices will have a negligible impact on the overall price index.
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small when compared to the ¯rst two channels.8
Three channels (lower monopoly rents, terms of trade improvement,
higher money demand) go in the direction of a lower general price level,
whereas one channel (higher wages) has an upward e®ect on the general
price level.
Realistically, the following constraints may be imposed on the parame-
ters. First, the degree of competition in the world market for tradable goods
is larger than in the domestic markets for non-tradable goods, i.e. µT > µN :
This is in line with Hakura (1998), who empirically ¯nds that both import
and export penetration have a signi¯cant negative impact on the price-cost
margins. Second, the price-elasticity of demand in the non-tradable goods
market satis¯es the condition µN > 2. This follows from Neiss (2001), who
¯nds an average labour income share in GDP of 50% for OECD countries.9
Most empirical papers ¯nd results that correspond to a price-elasticity of
demand (µ) in a range between 3.5 and 6. This corresponds to an average
mark-up [1=(µ ¡ 1)] of 20-40%. See Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000) for refer-
ences. Third, the share of tradables is less than 50% of output, i.e. ° < 12 .
In fact, for Europe, the share of agriculture and industry (which typically
produce tradable goods) in total output is some 25%, whereas the share of
(mostly non-tradable) services is some 75%.
For this range of values of the model parameters (µT > µN > 2; ° < 12),
the direct e®ect on the aggregate price level (lower monopoly rents) will
dominate the indirect e®ect (higher real wage), so that an increase in the
degree of competition in the non-tradables sector unambiguously lowers the
aggregate price level in the domestic economy. In fact, the minimum decline
in consumer prices in response to an increase in competition in the non-
tradables sector is equal to half the direct impact of the reduced mark-up
(the ¯rst channel). This result is supportive of the Single Market project
and of initiatives by EU national authorities to deregulate domestic services
markets.
If competition authorities target the wrong sector [i.e. if they enhance
8The real money balances channel will become negligible if ° ! 0 or ° ! 1, as can
be seen from the fully-reduced form. Intuitively, if the non-tradables sector is very small
(° ! 1), enhanced competition in the non-tradables sector leads to a negligible wealth
transfer (dF ! 0). Conversely, if the tradables sector is very small (° ! 0), a wealth
transfer which is large in terms of tradable goods will have a negligible impact on overall
consumption (and therefore also on money demand and the general price level).
9Labour income gives a lower bound for ¯rm production costs, whereas GDP gives an
upper bound for ¯rm sales. If production costs are at least 50% of ¯rm sales, then the
average pro¯t margin is not more than 100% of production costs, i.e. µNµN¡1 ¡1 < 1, which
is equivalent to µN > 2.
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competition in the tradables sector, despite that this sector is relatively
unimportant (° small) and competition in the other (non-tradables) sector
is very limited (µN extremely small)], adverse price e®ects may occur. In this
case, the price rise in the non-tradables sector may outweigh the price decline
in the tradables sector. The implication is that further deregulating the
tradables sector may be unattractive for countries with a highly protected
non-tradables sector. However, this possibility only occurs for implausible
parameter values.10
At the world level, the terms of trade e®ects and wealth transfers can-
cel out. For realistic parameter values, enhanced competition reduces the
average world price level:11
bPw = [ ÁN
2(µN ¡ 1) ¡
1 ¡ °
µN ¡ 1]
bµwN : (36)
4.4 Short-run impact
The short run is characterised by sticky wages (i.e. cW = cW ¤ = 0). However,
the mark-up for non-tradable goods can change as a result of competition
policy. Thus, in this model, contrary to Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995, 1996)
and Hau (2000, 2002), wage rigidity does not imply price rigidity per se, i.e.
short-run non-tradables price changes ( bPN) need not be zero. The short run
(period t) can be seen as a transition period, before the economy reaches its
long-run equilibrium. Short-run percentage changes are indicated by hatted
variables without overbars.
Since the short-run equilibrium is no steady state, the real interest rate
need not be constant. Output is demand-determined in the short run.
Therefore, short-run unemployment or labour shortages can occur.
The short-run world price level is:
bPw = ¡ 1 ¡ °
µN ¡ 1
bµwN : (37)
In the short run, wages only partially adjust to competition shocks.12 As a
10Numerically, if ° = 0:25 (corresponding to the joint share of industry and agriculture
in the gross domestic product in the US and Europe) then the aggregate price level is
declining in the degree of competitiveness in the tradables sector, unless µN < 1:5. If
° = 0:1 (roughly corresponding to the share of exports in the US gross domestic product,
the share is somewhat higher for Europe) then the aggregate price level is declining in µT ,
unless µN < 1:7.
11It is easy to show that ° < 12 or µT > µN is su±cient for 1¡ ° > ÁN .
12Nominal wages are ¯xed, but real wages are a®ected by the decline in the general
price level.
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result, the short-run impact of competition policy on the world price level
exceeds its long-run impact [compare formulas (36) and (37)].
The short-run change in the international CPI di®erential is
bP d = ·¡ 1 ¡ °
µN ¡ 1 +
°
D
(
µT ¡ 1
µT
)
ÁN
µN ¡ 1
¸bµdN : (38)
Enhanced competition leads to a decline in the general price level in the
short run. The reason is that the downward price impact of the decline in
the pro¯t margin in the non-tradables sector dominates the upward price
e®ect of the wage increase. Thus, increasing the degree of competition in
the non-tradables sector has bene¯cial short-run e®ects.
The general price decline which follows from the enhancement of compe-
tition re°ects a more e±cient allocation of resources. Therefore, monetary
policymakers (in case of Europe: the ECB) should fully accommodate this
decline.13 Enhanced competition permanently lowers the price level, but it
will only have a temporary e®ect on the level of in°ation.14 Accommodat-
ing the price e®ect of enhanced competition therefore implies the need for a
temporary adjustment of the policymaker's in°ation target. In order to de-
rive the appropriate size of the adjustment, monetary policymakers need to
distinguish the impact of enhanced competition from other sources of price
changes. Equations (35), (36), (37) and (38) can play a useful role in this re-
spect. Combined with an assessment of the length of the transitional period
and the timing of the price e®ects, in principle, the appropiate temporary
adjustment of the in°ation target can be derived.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyses the aggregate price impact of deregulation in the Eu-
ropean non-tradables sector in a dynamic framework. Recent initiatives,
both at the European level and in individual EU member states, promote a
higher degree of competition. The degree in many non-tradables (services)
markets is substantially less than in tradable (goods) markets. Therefore,
13In the case of product market deregulation, monetary policymakers will normally
respond to second-round e®ects only. An example of second-round e®ects is that an initial
reduction of in°ation due to regulatory reforms may dampen the pressure on nominal
wages (via lower in°ation expectations). No such second-round e®ects occur in this model.
This implies that monetary policymakers should fully accommodate the price declines
which follow from enhanced competition in this paper.
14It is important to note that this is not a conclusion of this paper. Rather, it follows
by construction of the model: in°ation is zero in the new steady state by assumption.
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the non-tradables markets are priority ¯elds of action for the competition
authorities.
Product market deregulation in one sector may have adverse spillovers
to other sectors. More competition in the non-tradables sector triggers an
increase in labour demand in the non-tradables sector, which causes a bid-
ding up of real wages, possibly leading to a higher price for tradables in
the new equilibrium. The implication is that deregulating the domestic ser-
vices sector, via its impact on wages, may make a country less competitive
internationally.
Under realistic assumptions, an increase in the degree of competition in
the non-tradables sector lowers the general price level in the domestic econ-
omy. This result is supportive of the Single Market project and of initiatives
by EU national authorities to deregulate domestic services markets.
I have highlighted four channels through which competition policy may
a®ect the general price level: (1) a decline in pro¯t margins (directly), (2) an
improvement in the terms of trade (via import prices), (3) an international
wealth transfer (via its impact on the demand for real money balances),
and (4) an increase in labour demand (via wages). Whereas the ¯rst three
channels contribute to lower prices, the fourth channel works in the other
direction. Algebraically, the fourth channel reduces the direct price impact
of lower pro¯t margins (the ¯rst channel) by roughly one-half. The second
and third channels are likely to be relatively small.
The model helps the ECB to distinguish the price impact of enhanced
competition (which does not, in principle, require a monetary policy re-
sponse) from other factors which in°uence the general price level.
18
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